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Properties Ranking
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Abstract Electoral systems are characterized by a wide spectrum of properties that cannot be
all satisﬁed at the same time. We aim at examining such properties within a hierarchical frame-
work, based on Analytic Hierarchy Process, performing pairwise comparisons at various levels
of a hierarchy to get a global ranking of the electoral systems. In this way it should be possible
to estimate the relative importance of each property with respect to the ﬁnal ranking of every
electoral formula.
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1. The basic motivations
In this paper we aim at using a method for social rankings and at its application as
a voting method (Section 5) and as a ranking tool of the properties of a set of voting
methods (Sections 6 and 7) for the selection of a perfect voting system that ﬁts at the
best a set of relevant properties. The ranking method is the Analytic Hierarchy Process
(Section 2). The method requires that each involved actor, either in isolation or in
co-operation, performs the proper rankings in real cases. It can potentially avoid the
theoretical hindrances of Section 4 and allow the fulﬁllment of the properties we list in
Section 3 (Grilli di Cortona et al. 1999).
Since our primary goal was the presentation of the method and the demonstration
of its use and usefulness in performing such rankings (Saaty 1980), we did not use
real actors in real cases. Moreover many of the rankings have been performed having
in mind the formal aspects of the Analytic Hierarchy Process rather than the involved
properties. In this way we show the formal aspects of the method that must be tested
in real cases with real actors that must perform real choices.
The paper is structured as follows. After a discussion of the mathematics of the
ranking method we propose some notes on electoral systems and comment the proper-
ties we wish they satisfy. Then we present a ranking example and propose it as a voting
method. The next step is the application of the ranking method to other cases so to get
a certain number of orderings. The last step is the association between orderings and
voting methods. The paper closes with some remarks and plans for future works.
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2. The mathematical tool
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (Saaty 1980; Saaty and Kearns 1985; and for ap-
plications Bhushan and Rai 2004) is a method for ranking n alternatives depending
on their order of importance or preference with respect to a main goal on the basis of
numerical evaluations on a ratio scale. It has been criticized in many papers, among
others Bana e Costa and Vansnick (2008).
The method starts with an analysis phase for the identiﬁcation of a set of elements
and the deﬁnition of a rooted hierarchy. At the root (level l = 0) we have the main goal
(MG), in many cases of political nature, whereas at the level of the leaves we have the
alternatives.
In Figure 1 we show a complete (or fully connected between contiguous levels)
hierarchy with a main goal, three actors (ac1, ac2 and ac3), four criteria (the cri) and
three alternatives (A, B and C).
Given any level l with m elements, if we want to evaluate the importance of the n
elements at level l+1 with respect to those at level l we build m matrices of size n×n.
In case of Figure 1 we have one 3×3 matrix to weigh the importance of the actors with
respect to MG, three 4×4 matrices to weigh the importance of the criteria with respect
to each of the actors and four 3×3 matrices to weigh the alternatives with respect to
each of the criteria. This phase is carried out by the actors that, either individually or
in co-operation, evaluate and properly merge the matrices of the pairwise comparisons
(Saaty 1980).
Figure 1. Example of a complete hierarchy
Each matrix A is evaluated performing pairwise comparisons between the elements
of level l +1 with regard to those at level l. A’s elements aij represent the relative
importance of element i with respect to element j, assume positive values from a pre-
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deﬁned scale and satisfy the conditions aii =1, aji =1/aij and (if A is fully consistent)
aij = aikakj with i, j,k = 1,...,n.
If A satisﬁes such properties it is called positive reciprocal and consistent. Either
aij or aji only is assigned one of the following values (whereas respectively aji or aij
assumes the reciprocal value, Saaty 1980): 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, respectively, to denote equal
importance, weak importance, strong importance, very strong importance, absolute
importance of element i over j and 2, 4, 6 or 8 as intermediate values.
Now we have the synthesis phase for the deﬁnition of a normalized vector of pri-
orities of the three alternatives with respect to MG. This calculation turns into a series
of eigenvalue/eigenvector problems whose full treatment (but for few details) is out of
the scope of this paper (see Saaty 1980).
Wheneach matrixAhasbeen evaluated wecanassociatetoitthenormalized vector
of the weights w = (w1,...,wn) with wi ∈ [0,1], å
n
i=1wi = 1 such that Aw = nw. w is
the eigenvector of A and lmax = n is the associated main eigenvalue of A (if it is fully
consistent), all the others being equal to 0.
If A is not fully consistent, lmax ≈ n. In this case the normalized eigenvector w0
represents a proxy of the real eigenvector w that is the better the more lmax tends to n.
The method has a criterion that allows the evaluation of the consistency of the matrix
A. If A is fully consistent we get n identical values, otherwise we get n slightly different
values that we can average to get the true value of lmax to be used to evaluate the degree
of consistency of the matrix.
The criterion uses the consistency index=(lmax−n)/(n−1) that is compared with
the average random index (provided in Saaty 1980 for different values of n) that repre-
sents the consistency index of a randomly generated reciprocal matrix on the same
scale and allows us to obtain the consistency ratio = consistency index/random index.
Values of consistency ratio equal to 0.0 deﬁne a fully consistent matrix, lower than
0.10 deﬁne a consistent matrix, values between 0.10 and 0.20 must be considered with
care, values greater than 0.20 (Saaty and Kearns 1985, p. 34) should impose a revision
of the judgments. The problem of consistency arises only when n > 2.
We have now the matrices Ai, each with the eigenvalue li and eigenvector wi. If
A1 is the matrix of the n1 elements at level 1 with respect to MG (level 0), we have a
vector w1 = L1 of the weights. If at level 2 we have n2 elements, we get n1 matrices
of size n2×n2 and therefore n1 eigenvectors wi of n2 elements each. We can construct
an n2×n1 matrix L2. If we want to evaluate the weights of the elements at level 2 with
respect to MG, we can simply evaluate the product1 L2L1 or a normalized vector of n2
elements. We can deﬁne the matrices of the pairwise comparisons of the elements at
level 3 with respect to those at level 2, be it A2, and deﬁne the matrix L3 of the vectors
of the weights. In order to get the weights of the elements at level 3 with respect to
MG we can evaluate L3L2L1 or a normalized vector of n3 elements.
The last step is a set of procedures for the evaluation of the normalized eigenvectors
from the matrices Ai without solving their characteristic equations. For our computa-
tions (Saaty 1980) we used the method of the n-th root of the product. To apply it we
1 We use row vectors and no symbol to denote transposition. Depending on the context a row vector must
be seen as column vector.
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multiplied the elements of each row among themselves, evaluated the n-th root (if n is
the dimension of the matrix) of that value and, lastly, normalized the resulting vector.
3. The desired properties or the wish lists
We start with a ﬁrst wish list of basic properties that are involved in Arrow’s The-
orem. (i) Universal Domain implies that the chosen aggregation method must be uni-
versally applicable so that from any rankings provided by the voters it must yield an
overall ranking of the candidates so to rule out “methods that would impose some
restrictions on the preferences of the voters” (Bouyssou et al. 2000, p. 17). (ii) Tran-
sitivity requires that the aggregation of the rankings must be a ranking that satisﬁes
transitivity. (iii) Unanimity or Pareto Condition implies that, if each voter ranks a can-
didate higher than another, this ranking must be reﬂected in the overall ranking. (iv)
Binary Independence (or Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives) requires that the
relative position of two candidates in the overall ranking depends only on their relative
position in each voter’s ranking so that all the other alternatives are seen as irrelevant.
(v) Non-dictatorship means that there is no voter that can impose his ranking as the
overall social ranking.
The Condorcet method satisﬁes properties (i), (iii), (iv) and (v) so that, by Arrow’s
Theorem, it must fail property (ii) whereas the Borda method satisﬁes properties (i),
(ii), (iii) and (v) so that, by Arrow’s Theorem, it must fail property (iv).
We can add the following properties, that may take a different meaning for pro-
portional and majoritarian methods. (vi) Anonymity (Taylor 2005) requires that the
overall ranking is independent from any permutation of the voters. (vii) Neutrality
(Taylor 2005) means that the overall ranking is independent from any permutation of
the alternatives. (viii) Separability (Bouyssou et al. 2000) requires that if we perform
an election with two separate sets of voters and obtain a winner candidate on each set
such candidate remains a winner if we repeat the election with the same method on the
union of the two sets of voters. (ix) Monotonicity (Bouyssou et al. 2000, p. 11) requires
that “an improvement of a candidate’s position in some of the voter’s preferences can-
notleadtoadeterioration ofhispositionaftertheaggregation”. (x)Non-manipulability
essentially means that the overall ranking of a set of candidates does not depend either
on the agenda or on the presence of straw candidates or on the expression of non true
preferences.
Majoritarian methods are characterized by the following properties. Condorcet
Winner (CW) is the winner of all pairwise comparisons, if it exists it should be the win-
ner of the electoral competition. Condorcet Loser (CL): a method should not choose
thecandidatethatloseseverypairwisecomparisonwithalltheothercandidates. Mono-
tonicity (M): a method is monotone if the number of seats assigned to a party does not
decrease if the number of its supporters grows. Pareto Principle (PP): if all the voters
prefer a candidate to another the latter cannot be chosen. Weak Axiom of Revealed Pre-
ference (WARP): it requires that, (a), if a candidate is a winner on a set X of candidates
it must remain a winner also on any subset X0 ⊆ X to which he belongs and that, (b), if
there are ties among candidates in X0 ⊆ X those candidates at par must be all either in-
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cluded or excluded from the ﬁnal set of winners in X. This axiom is used to get voting
methods immune from manipulations on the set of candidates through the addition of
straw candidates. Path Independence (PI): a method satisﬁes path independence if the
outcome is independent from the ordering of the phases that are used for the selection
of the candidates.
We note that Plurality method satisﬁes (vi), PP and WARP whereas Double Ballot
and Single Transferable Vote2 methods satisfy (vi), CL and PP.
Proportional methods are characterized by the following properties. House Mono-
tonicity (HM) means that if the number of seats passes from S to S+1 no party gets
fewer seats. Quota Satisfaction (QS) requires that the number of seats each party re-
ceives is as close as possible to its exact quota and so to a percentage of the total
seats that is almost equal to the percentage of the votes it receives. Population Mono-
tonicity (PM) (Grilli di Cortona et al. 1999) “a party (or state) with a growing weight
cannot lose a seat in favor of a party (or state) with a declining weight”. Consistency
(C) requires that any partial assignment is itself proportional. Stability (S) means that
whenever two parties merge in a coalition (or a new party) they do not get fewer seats
that those they get as separate entities.
We note that the Quota method satisﬁes (vi), HM, QS, C (only with regard to pairs
of eligible parties) and (v), Divisor methods satisfy (vi), HM, PM, C and S (only in
particular cases) whereas Largest remainders methods satisfy (vi), QS and S.
4. Some impossibility results
An electoral system represents a very complex process that can be decomposed
in a certain number of phases and whose performance can be measured with a set of
criteria and indicators (Grilli di Cortona et al. 1999).
An electoral system, starting from each voter’s ranking of a set of alternatives (the
candidates) from the best to the worse, aims at aggregating such rankings in a global
social ranking. This is a very hard task and literature is full of impossibility results.
The most famous is Arrow’s impossibility Theorem (Bouyssou et al. 2000): with more
than two candidates there is no aggregation method that can satisfy the properties of
Universal Domain, Transitivity, Unanimity or Pareto condition/principle, Binary Inde-
pendence and Non-dictatorship.
AnotherresultisSen’sTheorem(Saari2001), basedonaconditionofMinimalLib-
eralism (ML).3 It states that with more than two alternatives and two or more voters, if
Universal Domain, ML and Pareto are satisﬁed we are bound to have proﬁles (or sets
of preferences) that have cyclic outcomes. We mention also Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s
Theorem (Bouyssou et al. 2000) that concerns strategic voting (or the convenience of
not expressing one’s true preferences) and that states that with more than two candi-
2 In Grilli di Cortona et al. (1999, p. 29), Single transferable vote is cited among proportional methods
whereas in the Table at p. 78 it is put in comparison with other “most popular majoritarian methods”. We
chose the latter classiﬁcation for our comparisons of majoritarian methods, section 6.
3 A Social Welfare Function is is said to satisfy ML if (Saari 2001) each of at least two voters is decisive
over a pair of alternatives so that his ranking of such pair determines that pair’s societal ranking.
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dates there exists no aggregation method that satisﬁes simultaneously the properties of
Universal Domain, Non-manipulability and Non-dictatorship.
Other results may be found in Balinski and Peyton Young (1982), as the impossi-
bility of satisfying both population monotonicity and staying within for proportional
representation methods.
The properties we have listed with Arrow’s impossibility theorem are really mini-
mal for any real democratic process and things are even worse (Bouyssou et al. 2000)
with additional properties such as Neutrality, Separability, Monotonicity, Non-manipu-
labilityandsoon. SimilarconsiderationsholdalsoforGibbard-SatterthwaiteandSen’s
Theorems.
5. A ranking of alternatives
We have three voters vi (i = 1,2,3) that rank four alternatives aj (j = 1,2,3,4, e.g.
candidates in an electoral competition) so to deﬁne a total ordering with possible ties
(see Figure 2) .
Figure 2. Three voters and four alternatives
We wish to evaluate the normalized vector w of the weights of the voters with
regard to MG. Imposing a full symmetry we get a fully consistent 3×3 matrix (with all
elements equal to 1) to which it corresponds the eigenvalue lmax = 3 and a normalized
eigenvector L1 = (1/3,1/3,1/3). This result is consistent with our intuition of a fair
evaluation tool where the three voters have the same weight. Then we evaluate one 4×
4 matrix of the pairwise comparisons of the four alternatives for each voter according
to the following preferences (> denotes strict preference and ∼ indifference): v1 has
a1>a2>a3>a4, v2 has a1>a2>a3>a4 and v3 has a3∼a4>a2∼a1. The three
matrices (Table 1) satisfy at the best the requirements of Analytic Hierarchy Process
and reﬂect the voters’ judgments.
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Table 1. Pairwise comparisons with regard to v1, v2 and v3 (from left to right)
v1 a1 a2 a3 a4 v2 a1 a2 a3 a4 v3 a1 a2 a3 a4
a1 1 2 5 7 a1 1 2 1/2 1/4 a1 1 1 1/5 1/5
a2 1/2 1 2 3 a2 1/2 1 1/3 1/6 a2 1 1 1/5 1/5
a3 1/5 1/2 1 2 a3 2 3 1 1/3 a3 5 5 1 1
a4 1/7 1/3 1/2 1 a4 4 6 3 1 a4 5 5 1 1
Note: We use fractions to underline the relation between aij and aji.
We evaluate the eigenvectors (see Table 2), the corresponding eigenvalues and ve-
rify that each matrix is consistent.







The vector w is w=L2L1 =(0.2559, 0.1371, 0.2571, 0.3498) and gives the a4>a3>
a1 > a2 ordering on the alternatives.
At this point we have to understand what we got and for what. We got a ranking
but can we use it as if it was an election outcome? Maybe. The main problem is the
inconsistency issue. In the general case, indeed, we can have one or more inconsistent
matrices. How can we deal with this? There is any threshold above which we should
repeat a ranking? Or should we consider it anyway valid? Some of these questions will
remain unanswered, others will ﬁnd partial answers in Section 8.
6. Some rankings of properties
We deal with abstract properties of the families of majoritarian and proportional
methods to obtain a ranking of those properties so to deﬁne the perfect method within
each family.
We start with four voters who rank the six main properties of proportional methods
(see Figure 3): (vi), Anonymity (A), House Monotonicity (HM), Quota Satisfaction
(QS), Population Monotonicity (PM), Consistency (C) and Stability (S). The voters
have the following preference orderings: v1 has A > HM > QS > PM > C > S, v2
has A ∼ HM > QS ∼ PM >C > S, v3 has S >C ∼ PM > A > HM ∼ QS and v4 has
QS > HM ∼ A > PM ∼C ∼ S.
If each voter performs the pairwise rankings we get the Tables 3 and 4.
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Figure 3. Ranking properties of proportional methods
Table 3. Pairwise comparisons with regard to v1 and v2
v1 A HM QS PM C S v2 A HM QS PM C S
A 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 6.00 9.00 A 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 7.00
HM 0.50 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 HM 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 7.00
QS 0.33 0.50 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 QS 0.33 0.33 1.00 1.00 5.00 7.00
PM 0.25 0.50 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 PM 0.33 0.33 1.00 1.00 5.00 7.00
C 0.17 0.33 0.50 0.50 1.00 2.00 C 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.00 2.00
S 0.11 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 S 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.50 1.00
Table 4. Pairwise comparisons with regard to v3 and v4
v3 A HM QS PM C S v4 A HM QS PM C S
A 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.20 A 1.00 1.00 0.33 2.00 2.00 2.00
HM 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.14 HM 1.00 1.00 0.33 2.00 2.00 2.00
QS 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.14 QS 3.00 3.00 1.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
PM 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 PM 0.50 0.50 0.14 1.00 1.00 1.00
C 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 C 0.50 0.50 0.14 1.00 1.00 1.00
S 5.00 7.00 7.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 S 0.50 0.50 0.14 1.00 1.00 1.00
We evaluate the eigenvectors (the leftmost four columns of Table 5), the corre-
sponding eigenvalues and verify that each matrix is consistent. Since the four vot-
ers have the same weight with regard to MG L1 = (0.25,0.25,0.25, 0.25) so that as
w=L2L1 we get the ﬁfth column of Table 5 where the sixth column contains the listing
of the mnemonics of the properties and the last their place in the classiﬁcation.
A comparison of the classiﬁcation with the results of the table at page 83 of Grilli
di Cortona et. al (1999) allow us to assert that the best proportional method is the Quota
method. From that table we have that Quota method satisﬁes A, HM, QS, C (but only
in special cases) and S, and that wA+wHM +wQS = 0.65.
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Table 5. Eigenvectors alternatives versus voters and ﬁnal ranking of the alternatives
w1 w2 w3 w4 w
A 0.43 0.31 0.13 0.15 0.25 1
HM 0.22 0.31 0.07 0.15 0.19 3
QS 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.48 0.21 2
PM 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.12 5
C 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.07 0.08 6
S 0.05 0.03 0.47 0.07 0.16 4
Letussupposethatv2changeshispreferenceorderingasPM >A∼C>S>HM >
QS. If we evaluate the new eigenvector w2 we get a different second column of the Ta-
ble5andadifferentﬁnalpriorityvectorw=L2L1 =(0.23,0.13,0.18,0.12,0.17,0.18).
In this way we have that the ordering of the properties is A ￿ QS ∼ SPM ￿ HM ￿C.
From a comparison of that ordering with the results of the table at page 83 of Grilli di
Cortona et. al (1999) we get that the best proportional method is the Largest remainder
methods. From that table we have that Largest remainders methods satisfy A, QS and
S; Divisor methods satisfy A, HM, PM, C and S (but only in special cases) and Quota
method satisﬁes A, HM, QS, C (but only in special cases) and S.
The properties A, QS and S count for almost 60% over the total of the six properties
and a change of one voter’s opinion over four can be seen as a change of the opinion
of the 25% of the voters.
Figure 4. Ranking properties of majoritarian methods
We have a similar example with the properties of majoritarian methods. In Figure 4
we suppose to have four voters that rank the six main properties of these methods:
(vi), Anonymity (A), Condorcet Winner (CW), Condorcet Loser (CL), Pareto Principle
(PP), Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (WARP) and Path Independence (PI).
We give only the matrix L2 of the eigenvectors and the vector of the priorities of the
properties with regard to MG. The four matrices that give the eigenvectors of L2 are
based on the following preference orderings: v1 has A >CW >CL > PP >WARP >
PI, v2 hasCW ∼CL > PP > PI > A ∼WARP, v3 has PP > A > PI >WARP >CW ∼
CL and v4 has PP > PI > A ∼WARP >CW >CL.
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Table 6. Majoritarian methods: the eigenvectors of the weights wi and the ﬁnal vector of the
weights w
w1 w2 w3 w4 w0 w
A 0.49 0.05 0.21 0.17 0.25 0.23
CW 0.16 0.35 0.06 0.05 0.25 0.15
CL 0.13 0.35 0.06 0.03 0.25 0.14
PP 0.11 0.12 0.43 0.42 0.25 0.27
WARP 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.07
PI 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.24 0.13
Note: The ﬁrst four columns are the columns of the matrix L2 of the eigenvectors of the alternatives as to
the voters. The ﬁfth column contains the eigenvector L1 of the weights of the voters as to MG whereas the
sixth column represents the vectors of the weights of the alternatives as to MG.
Such matrices are consistent and the ﬁnal results are those of Table 6. The sixth
column is obtained by a matrix vector multiplication between the ﬁrst four columns
and the ﬁfth column. From these values we can devise the ordering PP > A >CW >
CL > PI >WARP with wPP+wA+wCL = 0.64 and wPP+wA+wWARP = 0.57.
Such results, in the light of the table at page 78 of Grilli di Cortona et. al (1999),
can be a little bit difﬁcult to interpret. From that table we have that: Plurality method
satisﬁes A, PP and WARP; Double Ballot and Single Transferable Vote methods satisfy
A, CL and PP; Approval Voting method satisﬁes A, WARP and PI. By confronting such
information we can say that both Double ballot and Single transferable vote methods
satisfy only A, CL and PP but only Plurality method satisﬁes A, PP and WARP. We can
therefore devise the preference ordering Single Transferable Vote ∼ Double Ballot >
Plurality and reach a ﬁnal decision by using other criteria.
7. Two more examples of ranking
We show two more examples of ranking electoral systems. In the ﬁrst example we con-
sider properties such as (i) Universal Domain (UD), (ii) Transitivity (TR), (iii) Pareto
Figure 5. Ranking electoral systems through ranking some basic properties
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 3 263L. Cioni
Table 7. A ﬁrst ranking of electoral systems, case of v1 and v2
v1 TR UD BI P v2 TR UD BI P
TR 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 TR 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.33
UD 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 UD 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.20
BI 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 BI 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.14
P 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 P 3.00 5.00 7.00 1.00
Table 8. A ﬁrst ranking of electoral systems, case of v3 and v4
v3 TR UD BI P v4 TR UD BI P
TR 1.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 TR 1.00 0.17 3.00 0.25
UD 0.33 1.00 2.00 1.00 UD 6.00 1.00 9.00 2.00
BI 0.20 0.50 1.00 0.50 BI 0.33 0.11 1.00 0.14
P 0.33 1.00 2.00 1.00 P 4.00 0.50 7.00 1.00
Condition (P) and (iv) Binary Independence (BI) and four voters that perform a ranking
of these properties (see Figure 5).
The four matrices of the pairwise comparisons (Tables 7 and 8) are based on the
following preference orderings of the voters: v1 has TR >UD ∼ BI ∼ P, v2 has P >
TR >UD > BI, v3 has TR > P ∼UD > BI and v4 has UD > P > TR > BI.
All the matrices are consistent and the normalized eigenvectors are those of the
ﬁrst four columns of Table 9 where the ﬁfth column represents the eigenvector of the
matrix of the pairwise comparisons of the four voters with regard to MG. From both
calculations and fairness considerations such a vector has all components equal to 0.25.
The sixth column gives the global weights or priorities of the four properties with
regard to MG. We have TR ∼ P >UD > BI. Such a ranking is satisﬁed, for instance,
by the Borda count (that does not satisfy binary independence) that therefore can be
legitimately chosen.
We note indeed that wTR+wUD+wP = 0.90 so that Binary independence can be
surely neglected.
Table 9. The eigenvectors of the weights wi and the ﬁnal vector of the weights w
w1 w2 w3 w4 w0 w
TR 0.50 0.17 0.53 0.10 0.25 0.32
UD 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.54 0.25 0.26
BI 0.17 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.25 0.10
P 0.17 0.60 0.19 0.32 0.25 0.32
Note: The ﬁrst four columns are the columns of the matrix L2 of the eigenvectors of the alternatives as to
the voters. The ﬁfth column contains the eigenvector L1 of the weights of the voters as to MG whereas the
sixth column represents the vectors of the weights of the alternatives as to MG.
The other example involves a ranking of majoritarian M and proportional methods
P (Figure 6). We have three voters (v1, v2 and v3) that use four properties (p1, p2, p3
and p4) to obtain a ranking between M and P to see which is better.
264 AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 3Ranking Electoral Systems through Hierarchical Properties Ranking
Figure 6. Majoritarian or proportional? The basic dilemma
In Figure 6 we have a rooted hierarchy where the leaves are at level 3 so we have
to deﬁne the matrix L3, the matrix L2 and the vector L1 and evaluate the vector w of
the two alternatives M and P with respect to MG as w = L3L2L1.
From considerations we have already made L1 = (0.33, 0.33, 0.33). The hard part
is the deﬁnition of the four properties. We can try with the following set (Grilli di
Cortona et. al 1999): (xi) Electoral Participation (EP) deﬁned as the ratio between
the number of vote cast and the difference between the total number of voters and the
number of vote cast; (xii) Number of Political Parties (NPP) deﬁned through parame-
ters that count both the number of parties that compete in a given election and their
relative strength; (xiii) Electoral Volatility (EV) as a measure of the electoral ﬂuxes
among the competing parties from one electoral competition to the successive one;
(xiv) Government Stability (GS) measured as a function of the longevity of the govern-
ments.
The actors are supposed to act according to the following preference orderings: v1
has EP > NPP > GS ∼ EV, v2 has EP > EV > NPP ∼ GS and v3 has GS > NPP >
EP > EV.
The four matrices at level 3 (Table 10) are the outcome of a collaborative process
involving the voters through which they rank the two alternatives (M and P) according
to the four properties EP, NPP, EV and GS.
Individually they rank those properties as to each one’s system of values (Table 11)
as represented by their preference orderings.
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Table 10. Matrices of the pairwise comparisons with regard to the properties
EP M P NPP M P EV M P GS M P
M 1.00 0.33 M 1.00 0.50 M 1.00 0.20 M 1.00 4.00
P 3.00 1.00 P 2.00 1.00 P 5.00 1.0 P 0.25 1.00
Note: Every group of three columns is a matrix of the pairwise comparisons of the alternatives with regard
to each property.
Table 11. Pairwise comparisons with regard to v1, v2 and v3 form left to righ
v1 EP NPP EV GS v2 EP NPP EV GS v3 EP NPP EV GS
EP 1.0 5.0 7.0 7.0 EP 1.0 7.0 3.0 7.0 EP 1.0 0.5 2.0 0.2
NPP 0.2 1.0 2.0 2.0 NPP 0.14 1.0 0.5 1.0 NPP 2.0 1.0 3.0 0.33
EV 0.14 0.5 1.0 1.0 EV 0.33 2.0 1.0 2.0 EV 0.50 0.33 1.0 0.11
GS 0.14 0.5 1.0 1.0 GS 0.14 1.0 0.5 1.0 GS 5.0 3.0 9.0 1.0
It is easy to see how the matrices of Table 10 are fully consistent whereas the
matrices of Table 11 are consistent.
At this point we have a 2×4 matrix L3 of the eigenvectors of the priorities of
the alternatives with respect to the properties, a 4 × 3 matrix L2 of the eigenvec-
tors of the priorities of the properties with respect to the actors and a vector L1 =
(0.333, 0.333, 0.333) that is the eigenvector of the priorities of the actors with respect
to MG.
We can obtain the priorities of the two alternatives with respect to MG as w =
L3L2L1 = (0.3970, 0.6029) so to get P > M and say that proportional methods are
preferred to majoritarian methods. The next step would be the choice, through an
analogous procedure, of one of the many available proportional methods.
8. Open theoretical problems
In the previous sections we introduced Analytic Hierarchy Process as either a vot-
ing system or as a tool for the ranking of electoral systems.
In the former case (but similar considerations hold also in the latter case) we have a
hierarchy where three voters rank four alternatives so to deﬁne a social choice function
of such alternatives. Are we sure in this way we got an electoral system that proves
to be immune from the contagion of Arrow’s Theorem and the other results we listed
in Section 4? Saaty (1980, p. 52–53) and Saaty and Kearns (1985, p. 198–199) are
conﬁdent this is the case. Also Saari (2001), a more neutral source, is quite sure that
this is the case.
Saari (2001) shows how to overcome such theoretical limitations by using methods
that do not miss meaningful information in the execution of pairwise comparisons
between candidates or alternatives. In presence of more than one level of aggregation
(see the left side of Figure 7), there can be discrepancies on the rankings (according to
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common criteria) of the alternatives (the leaves of the binary tree) among the various
levels of inner nodes.
Figure 7. Binary [rooted] tree versus [rooted] hierarchy: meaningful information (in bold)
The problem occurs since nodes 2 and 3 do not share the same information. The
solution that we (after Saaty and Saari) propose is the use of a complete rooted hierar-
chy where missing meaningful information is recovered with the bold face arcs (see the
right side of Figure 7). Through a complete hierarchy we can execute pairwise com-
parisons of all elements at level i+1 among themselves for any element at level i and
compose the results up to the root of the hierarchy. The proposed method is therefore
a potential theoretical solution to the problem of deﬁning a perfect voting system.
Many problems are yet present and beg for a solution. The ﬁrst problem is how
the system we showed in Section 5 can scale to be used as a voting system when many
more voters and alternatives are present.
An increase in the number of alternatives makes the ranking problem harder so
that the probability of producing inconsistent matrices becomes higher and higher with
that number. Since it is usually impossible to reduce the number of alternatives at a
manageable level one solution is the use of clustering techniques together with the use
of hierarchies with more levels that those used in Section 5.
As to the number of voters we note how in many cases it is ﬁxed by political rules
so that it must be seen as a parameter of our method on which we cannot act but
indirectly. Since, however, the proﬁles of ranking over a ﬁxed scale tend to be repeated
one possible solution is to gather common proﬁles as prototype voters and to assign
each of them a weight that is a measure of the number of voters that have that proﬁle.
In this way we can reduce the number of voters to manageable quantities.
Therefore we need to evaluate to what extent the criticism moved to Saaty’s method
in Bana e Costa and Vansnick (2008) (see Section 2) may weaken our application, how
experts or actors can rank alternatives with regard to properties or policies (see Figure
6), how to take into account the point of views and the goals of voters and candidates
and, lastly, how to frame our approach among the other proposed approaches (Grilli di
Cortona et al. 1999) so to put in evidence its strengths and weaknesses.
Another open problem is that of understanding how actors can evaluate the alter-
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natives with respect to the properties (see Figure 6) and if any solution can work also
for many more actors and alternatives.
The ranking from experts or actors involves the attainment of a consensus among
them either as a co-ordinate and co-operative simultaneous effort or as a two step pro-
cess where (a) each of them produces all the pairwise rankings, including those of the
others, and (b) such rankings are merged (through an averaging of some sort) in the
appropriate global rankings.
One more problem we mention is that of inconsistencies since we have to under-
stand if we have to care of any inconsistency, in which way and if there is any inconsis-
tency threshold (beyond the value of 0.10) above which we should declare any voting
outcome as null.
Last but not least there is the possibility that a more subtle and perverse version of
Arrow’s Theorem is lurking out there. In this case Analytic Hierarchy Process would
prove nothing more than another blind alley (at least for the search of a perfect voting
system). A solution to this yet open problem can derive only from further theoretical
and empirical investigations both within the framework of Analytic Hierarchy Process
and within the area of electoral systems.
9. Concluding remarks and suggestions for future research
We presented an original approach for both the ranking of electoral systems and the
deﬁnition of a voting method. This approach is based on a complete rooted hierarchy.
At the root we have the MG whereas at the leaves we put the objects we want to rank
through the hierarchy. The paper represents a starting point, much more work needs
indeed to be done both from a theoretical and from an empirical point of view.
As to the theoretical aspects it should be interesting to investigate both the proper-
ties of the proposed voting method (Section 5) and the properties of the methods for
the ranking of electoral systems (Sections 6 and 7) to see if they can be used for the
selection of an electoral system among the many that can be conceived.
From the empirical point of view future research includes the testing of the pro-
posed approach with some experiments with the involvement of both students in social
sciences, experts in voting systems and simple citizens voters.
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